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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20010949-CA

vs.
DAVID B. SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for communications fraud, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for communications
fraud?1
Standard of Review. This Court "view[s] the evidence and all inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^
18, 10 P.3d 346. It will not reverse that verdict unless "the evidence 'is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a

1

Defendant does not challenge his conviction for securities fraud. See Aplt. Brf.

reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was
convicted."1 Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212
(Utah 1993)).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1801 (1990)
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions,
and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of:
* * *

(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or
thing obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not
exceed $100,000;
* * *

(6) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow,
convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk
over; or to transmit information. Means of communication include, but are not
limited to, use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper,
computer, and spoken and written communication.
* * *

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged by amended information with one count of securitiesfraud,or
in the alternative, communicationsfraud;one count of communicationsfraud;one count of
theft; and two counts of money laundering. R. 22-24. Following a preliminary hearing,
defendant was bound over for trial on securities fraud and communications fraud only. R.
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81-82; see also R. 278: 691-92. The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the
bindover order and this Court denied defendant's petition for an interlocutory appeal. R. 83117, 139, 169-72, 176.2
Following a three-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty as charged. R. 729-35; 787,
930-32. Before sentencing, defendant filed a pro se Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial. R. 832-40. Without addressing the
motion, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of not more than ten
years for securities fraud and one-to-fifteen years for communications fraud. R. 883-85,
895-96. The sentences were suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation
for 36 months. R. 896-97. Defendant timely appealed his conviction for communications
fraud. R. 888-89. The trial court thereafter denied defendant's Motion for a Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative Motion for a New Trial. R. 939-40.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

An Investment Opportunity
On October 13,1994, Marc Sorenson visited hisfriendLance Hatch at Hatch's home
in St. George. R. 930: 95-96, 117-20. During the visit, Hatch told Sorenson about an
investment opportunity that he said was being run by defendant. R. 930: 95, 130. Hatch
explained that the investments received would be used to create a $500,000 bank account
2

At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution relied in part on a transcript of
defendant's interview with Nevada authorities. See R. 57: 208-09. Defendant moved to
quash the bindover order after discovering that the first page of the transcript incorrectly
attributed to defendant offhand remarks made by a Nevada assistant attorney general that
were in the nature of a confession by defendant. See R. 83-117, 139.
3

that was needed to permit the legal transfer of a large quantity of money from a foreign
country into the United States. R. 930:121,130-31. He explained that there would be a "big
commission" for those who set up the account and expressed his belief that "there was a
great deal of money to be made" by those who invested. R. 930: 117-18, 121, 130. Hatch
told Sorenson that he had spoke with defendant about the investment, but that he could not
personally sell the investment because he did not have a license as a financial advisor. R.
930: 117,120,130. He also indicated that he would invest in the scheme himself, if only he
had the money to do so. R. 930: 119.
After Hatch told Sorenson how impressed he was with the opportunity, Sorenson
expressed an interest in the investment and asked to find out more about it. R. 930: 95-96,
117-18. Because Hatch had learned about the investment from Lee Walker—an attorneyfriend of his in Las Vegas who had done business with defendant—he telephoned Walker to
discuss defendant's character and expertise. R. 930:97,122-23,130,139. In that telephone
conversation, Walker assured Sorenson that defendant was able to perform on the investment
and he otherwise vouched for defendant's integrity. See R. 930: 97, 122-23, 142.
Sorenson 9s Telephone Conversation with Defendant
After the two spoke with Walker, Hatch telephoned defendant, who explained the
investment opportunity in greater detail to Sorenson. R. 930: 96-97,122,125,139-40,143.
In that call, defendant confirmed that he was running the investment. See R. 930: 97-98.
Defendant represented to Sorenson that a foreigner named Walid Summa was attempting to
transfer one billion dollars into the United States. R. 930: 98,131-32. He explained that in
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order to do so legally, an independent bank account of $500,000 needed to be set up in the
United States. R. 930: 98-99. Defendant told Sorenson that an account had been set up in
the name of the investment brokerage house of Bear Stearns, and that once the $500,000 was
raised, the one billion dollars could be transferred to the United States through that account.
R. 930: 99. He explained that those who set up the bank account would receive a large
commission on the one billion dollars. R. 930: 99-100, 150. He said that if Sorenson
invested, he would "make a profit of 275 percent on the money invested within a period of
approximately two and-a-half months." R. 930: 99-100.
Defendant did not advise Sorenson to further investigate Walid Summa, nor did he
advise him to employ a brokerage firm to give him advice regarding the proposed
investment. R. 930: 132-34. Instead, defendant told Sorenson that he had done many such
investments in the past and that this investment "was the closest thing to a sure thing that you
could ever get." R. 930: 101,170, 178.
The Investment Contract
Two days later, Sorenson agreed to invest $100,000 and signed a Memorandum of
Understanding that directed that the $100,000 investment funds be transferred to the Bear
Steams account and to defendant's account. R. 930: 102,105-09,147-48; see also R. 932:
932: 337. Two days after that, on October 17, 1994, Sorenson signed a second, modified
Memorandum of Understanding, specifically directing that $50,000 be sent to the Bear
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Stearns account and $50,000 be sent to defendant's account. R. 930: 109.3 Sorenson did not
give defendant permission to use the money for personal items, but understood, based on his
conversation with defendant, that all $100,000 would be invested. R. 930: 102-03.
Unbeknownst to Sorenson, the Memorandum bore several hallmarks of a fraudulent
transaction. For example, it referred to Prime Bank Instruments, which have never been
found to be legitimate transactions. R. 931: 217, 219.4 It referred to a World Prime Bank,
which does not exist. R. 931: 217. It referred to "banking days," which has no legitimate
meaning in the investment context. R. 931: 217-18. It referred to rules and regulations of
the International Chamber of Commerce, which does not issue rules or regulations. R. 931:
219. And finally, it promised an unrealistic rate of return. R. 931: 218.
At Hatch's suggestion, Sorenson directed that the money be sent through a trust
account controlled by Walker in Nevada with instructions that it be distributed according to
the investment contract. R. 930:102,126,165,167. Hatch reasoned that the money should
be sent through Walker's trust account to make sure that it did not go directly to defendant
and because he wanted to hold Walker's "feet to the fire" as the person who told Hatch about

3

Anthony Taggert, director of the Utah Division of Securities, testified that the
transaction culminating in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding fit the
definition of an investment contract, and as such, was subject to the securities disclosure
laws. R. 931:244-51. Based on Taggert's testimony, the jury learned that defendant failed
to disclose a number of facts that the average investor would find important in making an
investment decision. R. 931: 248-51. Based in part on these omissions, the jury found
defendant guilty of securities fraud. See R. 787.
4

Based on his investigation of some 1,000 such transactions dating back to 1993,
Herbert A. Biern, a senior official with the Federal Reserve Board, provided expert
testimony on thefraudulentnature of "prime bank instruments." See R. 931: 208-20.
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the investment. R. 930: 167. On October 18, 1994, a day after he signed the second
Memorandum, Sorenson transferred $100,000 to Walker's account. R. 930: 161. On that
same day, $50,000 was transferred from Walker's trust account to the Bear Stearns account
and $50,000 was transferred from Walker's account to defendant in Florida. R. 930: 162.
Defendant's Personal Use of Investment Funds
The wire transfer increased defendant's account balance from zero to $50,000. R.
930:162. Defendant did not use the funds for investment purposes as represented. Within a
day of receiving the funds, defendant wrote a check from the account for nearly $35,000 for
the purchase of a new Jeep. R. 930: 163; R. 931: 293-94. Within a week, the remaining
balance was also used for personal expenses, including a $2,000 check payable to cash, a
$6,500 house payment, and a $2,000 tuition payment. R. 930: 159, 163-64. Nothing was
drawn from the account that would qualify as an investment expense. R. 930: 164-65.
Defendant's Assurances that Sorenson Would Receive His Money
When Sorenson did not receive his money as represented, he repeatedly telephoned
defendant to find out when he would receive it. See R. 930: 103, 173-74. Each time,
defendant assured him that he would get his money. R. 930:104,174. He claimed that uthe
money was imminent, that it was going to be back," and that he was working on a deal to get
the money back. R. 930: 104,174. Not once, however, did defendant divulge to Sorenson
that he had spent the funds on personal expenses. R. 930: 104-05. Sorenson never received
any money. R. 930: 95.
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In April 1995, Sorenson filed a complaint with Nevada authorities against Walker,
through whom the money was transferred. R. 930: 104, 135-36. Thereafter, defendant
telephoned Sorenson, blaming Sorenson for the failure and threatening to sue Sorenson. R.
930: 104. Later, at defendant's preliminary hearing, defendant walked up to Sorenson and
told him that he realized he needed to get Sorenson's money back to him. R. 930: 105.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he devised the
fraudulent investment scheme. This claim lacks merit. Sorenson testified that based on a
telephone conversation with defendant and Hatch, he understood that defendant was running
the scheme. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant told him that he was running the
scheme. On the other hand, if Hatch made the statement during the call, the jury could infer
that defendant ratified that statement because nothing suggests that he disputed its veracity.
Other evidence also supports the finding. By defendant's own admission, Walker sought
directionfromhim as to where the funds should be distributed. In addition, the investment
contract provided defendant's bank coordinates and directed that half of the investment
money be sent to defendant. Andfinally,defendant received and spent the money.
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
communicated with Sorenson for the purpose of concealing the scheme. Defendant does not
challenge the evidence per se, but claims that based on his own testimony, the evidence
establishes only a moral obligation for him to repay the money. Defendant's claim fails
because the jury is not required to accept defendant's version of the facts.
8

ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
Under Utah law, a person is guilty of communications fraud if he or she udevise[s]
any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or
anything of value by means of false orfraudulentpretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and [ ] communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice." Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1801(1) (1990). Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish
two elements of the crime: (1) that he devised the fraudulent scheme or artifice, and (2) that
he communicated with the victim for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme.
Aplt. Brf. at 22-27. Defendant's contention lacks merit.
A.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JURY FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT DEVISED THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME

Defendant does not dispute that the evidence established the existence of a fraudulent
scheme or artifice. Rather, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that it was
he who devised that scheme. Defendant acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that defendant
explained the investment scheme to him, but argues that mere knowledge of the scheme is
insufficient to establish that he devised the scheme. Aplt. Brf. at 22-23, 25. He also
acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that he understood defendant to be the person running
the investment scheme, but argues that it is insufficient because it is based on the hearsay
statements of Hatch. Aplt. Brf. at 25. Defendant's argument ignores the evidence.
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Defendant's knowledge of the investment scheme, standing alone, would be
insufficient to establish that he devised the scheme. And standing alone, Hatch's hearsay
statement regarding defendant's role in the scheme, not objected to at trial, would be
insufficient. See State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1115 (Utah 1989) (holding that "a single
uncorroborated hearsay statement is not substantial evidence and not sufficient to support a
verdict"). However, the State's evidence that defendant devised the scheme was not limited
to the foregoing testimony.
Sorenson also testified that Walker told him defendant had "orchestrated" the
investment scheme. R. 930: 142. And more importantly, defendant's role as the author of
the scheme was confirmed in Sorenson's telephone conversation with defendant himself.
During the prosecutor's direct examination of Sorenson, the following exchange took place:
Prosecutor:

Based on the two phone calls that you have previously
described—narrow it down—based on your phone call to
Mr. Smith, did you come to an understanding of who was
running the investment?

Sorenson:

Yes, I did.

Prosecutor:

Who was that?

Sorenson:

Mr. Smith.

R. 930: 97-98. Although Sorenson did not expressly testify that defendant told him he was
running the investment scheme, the jury could reasonably infer that Sorenson came to
understand that defendant was running the investment scheme because defendant told him so
during the telephone conversation.
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Because Hatch also participated in the call, it is possible that he, rather than
defendant, informed Sorenson during the call that defendant was running the investment
scheme. Even so, defendant obviously did not deny he was running the investment scheme
because Sorenson finished the call with that understanding intact. Defendant's silence would
therefore imply a tacit acceptance or ratification of any statement made by Hatch to that
effect. Cf. Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Utah 1998) (holding that a principal's
"silence with full knowledge of the facts may manifest affirmance and thus operate as a
ratification").
In later direct examination, the following testimony was also elicited:
Prosecutor:

Did you and Mr. Smith have any discussion one way or
another about the risk of loss in this investment?
Yes, we did.
And, basically, what did Mr. Smith tell you?
Paraphrasing, he said it was the closest thing to a sure thing
that you could ever get.

Sorenson:
Prosecutor:
Sorenson:
* * *

Prosecutor:
Sorenson:

Did Mr. Smith tell you anything about his experience in
doing these types of investments?
He said that he had done many of them in the past.

R. 930: 101. This testimony brings into context the conversation between Sorenson and
defendant. Defendant specifically discussed his past experiences of "doing" or running such
investments and the jury could reasonably infer that he represented to Sorenson that the
investment he was "doing" now "was the closest thing to a sure thing that you could ever
get." R. 101.
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That defendant devised the investment scheme was also established by defendant's
own testimony and the circumstantial evidence surrounding the investment. Defendant
himself acknowledged that within a few days after he spoke with Sorenson, Walker called
him wanting to know where the $100,000 should be transferred.

R. 931: 288. The

Memorandum of Understanding provided defendant's bank coordinates and directed that half
of the investment go to that account. R. 930: 109. And finally, $50,000 was in fact
transferred to defendant's bank account, which he immediately spent. R. 930:162-65. This
evidence strongly buttresses Sorenson's testimony that defendant orchestrated the scheme.
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant had in fact devised the
scheme and realized the fruits of that scheme when he receive the $50,000 wire transfer.
In addition, the jury was free to consider defendant's statement to Sorenson at the
preliminary hearing that he realized he needed to get Sorenson's money back to him. R. 930:
105. Although the statement might simply imply a moral obligation to return the money, the
jury was also free to infer that it manifested a consciousness of guilt, and therefore, guilt
itself. Cf. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, t 23 n.6, 10 P.3d 346 (referring to evidence of
flight).
Defendant claims, however, that the evidence was insufficient because Sorenson's
friend Hatch, not defendant, told him about the investment, provided him with the
investment contract, and suggested that the money go through Lee Walker's trust account.
Aplt. Brf. at 23-24. The State, however, was not required to prove that every aspect of the
offer and sell of the security originated from defendant. The State was only required to
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prove that defendant "devised" the fraudulent scheme. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801(1). Thus, it is of no moment that Hatch was the person whofirstapproached Sorenson
about the investment. Nor is it of any import that Hatch, rather than defendant, provided
Sorenson with the Memorandum of Understanding, informed Sorenson that there were other
investors, or suggested that the investment funds go through Walker's trust account. None of
these facts undermine the State's evidence that defendant "devised" the fraudulent scheme.
One cannot shield himselffromcriminal liability simply by perpetrating thefraudthrough
others.
Defendant also criticizes the evidence because Sorenson did not know how Hatch
obtained the Memorandum of Understanding, did not have a specific recollection of signing
a second memorandum, and did not recall the reasons for modifying the original
memorandum. Aplt. Brf. at 23-24. These gaps in the evidence, however, do not in any way
undermine the evidence introduced at trial establishing that defendant devised the investment
scheme. As held by the Supreme Court in State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,544 (Utah 1994),
a defendant "is not entitled to reversal of [his] conviction... simply because there are some
gaps in the State's evidence."
Finally, defendant points to his own testimony denying that he had anything to do
with the investment scheme and claiming that he believed the $50,000 wire transfer was a
paymentfromSumma on an outstanding debt. Aplt. Brf. at 24-25. These disclaimers do not
undermine the sufficiency of the evidence. "The jury need not accept defendant's version of
the facts but may disregard it in whole or in part." Goddard, 871 P.2d at 544. Defendant "is

13

not entitled to reversal of [his] conviction simply because [his] version of the facts is
different from the State's." Id.
B.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JURY FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT COMMUNICATED WITH THE VICTIM FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CONCEALING THE FRAUDULENT SCHEME

Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
"'communicate[d] directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of
either 'executing the scheme or artifice' or 'concealing the scheme or artifice.1" Aplt. Brf at
25-26 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)). This claim also lacks merit.
Defendant acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that he spoke with defendant on the
telephone six times concerning payment on his investment. Aplt. Brf. at 26 (citing R. 930:
103-04,174). He also acknowledges Sorenson's testimony that defendant represented that
the money was "imminent" and would be paid. Aplt. Brf. at 26 (citing R. 930: 104, 174).
He does not, however, explain why that testimony is insufficient to establish that he
communicated with Sorenson for the purpose of concealing the scheme. Therefore, his
claim must fail. See West Valley City v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App 223, f 13, 51 P.3d 52
(holding that appellant must marshal the evidence supporting the finding and then "must
ferret out a fatal flaw in th[at] evidence").5

Where the evidence established that defendant devised the scheme, see supra, at 914, and that he had already spent the $50,000 transferred to his account, R. 930: 163-65, the
evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that defendant omitted the material fact that
he had spent the money, and misrepresented that the money was "imminent," for the purpose
of concealing the fraudulent scheme. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1).
14

Defendant's only challenge to the evidence rests on his own testimony that he did not
know the money camefromSorenson until after he had spent it. Aplt. Brf. at 26 (citing R.
931: 300). Relying on that testimony, defendant argues that "the evidence only demonstrates
the moral obligation to return Sorenson's money which [defendant] felt when he learned
where the deposit actually originated." Aplt. Brf. at 26. As noted above, however, "[t]he
jury need not accept defendant's version of the facts but may disregard it in whole or in
part." Goddard, 871 P.2d at 544. Defendant's claim on this point thus also fails.
* * *

In summary, defendant's conviction for communications fraud is supported by
Sorenson's testimony, defendant's testimony, the terms of the investment contract, and the
evidence establishing that defendant received and spent $50,000 of Sorenson's investment.
It cannot be said that "the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime for which he [ ] was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 18
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1212).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
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